**A Letter from the Four Survivors of the 1979 Greensboro Massacre Currently Residing in Greensboro to the City Council of Greensboro**

October 17, 2017

**Group 3. Bullet points 3 & 5**

**“Adopting a “Low Profile” Plan that Deployed Officers Away from March Formation: Adopting a low profile tactical plan that kept uniformed police away from the site of the parade during the time when marchers would be gathering and their armed assailants would be en route to carry out a known, planned confrontation with them.”** (p.2)

**…**

**“Lack of Pursuit of Fleeing Suspected Perpetrators: Not pursuing suspected perpetrators of criminal action as they fled the scene.”** (p.2)

The option of a police presence to accompany and monitor the weapons-laden caravan on its route … did not happen due to the police decision to have a “low profile.” A “low profile” (which could include a range of policing options) actually translated in this case into a plan to station the tactical units several or many blocks from the parade’s actual starting point, meaning they would not be at Carver and Everitt Street. The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report of May 2006 (on p. 200) concluded that even if the officers had been at their assigned positions after lunch, and had been there as early as 11:13 a.m. when Cooper made his radio transmission stating “Caravan of nine cars moving toward the parade starting point from Interstate 85 and Randleman Road” (about 4 miles away from Everitt and Carver) --they would have arrived too late to protect the marchers and locals. (p.9)

The problem with the police’s “low profile” tactical plan was that it kept the units away from Everitt and Carver, the starting point of the parade. Knowing what they knew, the police designed and followed a plan--“early lunch” and “low profile” --that cleared the field for entry of the armed caravan into the rally space. It gave those who avowedly were looking for a confrontation plenty of time, at least until 11:30 a.m., to work their damage unhindered by a police presence. (p.9)

On November 3, 1979 there was not only a low profile but in spite of all the information known to the police at the time, THERE WAS NO PRESENCE, **NOT ONE SINGLE UNIFORMED POLICE OFFICER** WAS ON THE SCENE THAT DAY. To this very day there has been no explanation as to why Lt. Trevor Hampton, the Police Officer who shook Nelson Johnson’s hand and vowed to meet him at Carver and Everett Street, was not present. Further, Hampton has himself said nothing and there is no substantial mention of him in any report… (p.9)

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The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission (GTRC) in Chapter 7 of its 2006 report, thoroughly researched the sequence of events leading up to the November 3rd assault. They traced the movements and communications of the officers responsible for covering the WVO/CWP parade…The paragraph quoted below addresses one particular police “excuse” for their absence from the parade origin.

One of the police department’s most often repeated reasons for why no police were present on Nov. 3 was over confusion because the WVO/CWP changed the starting point of the parade. The GTRC finds this to be simply untrue. The WVO/CWP designated on their parade permit that Everitt and Carver was the starting point, and Nelson Johnson explained the discrepancy with the posters to Captain Gibson when he applied for the permit. The discrepancy was repeatedly discussed in planning meetings on Nov. 1 and Nov. 3. It was repeatedly emphasized that the starting point was to be at Everitt and Carver. In their depositions, Spoon, Daughtry, Burke, Hightower and Cooper all say they understood Carver and Everitt to be the starting location.

The claim that police were confused about the starting point of the parade is, or should be, completely debunked. It was a police lie told for popular consumption and frequently enough spread in the mass media so that in time it oozed into people’s false consciousness about November 3rd. (pp.9-10)

…

Nor did Spoon [Field Commander on November 3rd] or anyone else in the GPD order that the assailants in the caravan cars be pursued as they fled the scene of the crime. The arrest of several Klansmen and Nazis that day was fortuitous. The yellow van, the last vehicle in the caravan and the one with the shooters and most of the weapons, was tardy in leaving the area and the two police officers who stopped the van were never ordered to be at Carver and Everitt. (p.11)